Household risk management, that is, households' insurance against adverse shocks to income, assets, and financing needs, is limited and often completely absent, in particular for poor households. We explain this basic pattern in household insurance in an infinite horizon model in which households have access to complete markets subject to collateral constraints resulting in a trade-off between the financing needs for consumption and durable goods purchases and risk management concerns. We show that household risk management is monotone in household net worth and income, under quite general conditions, in economies with income risk, durable goods, and durable goods price risk. The limited participation in markets for claims which allow household risk management is a result of the financing risk management trade-off and should not be considered a puzzle.
Introduction
We argue that the absence of household risk management is due to the fact that households' financing needs exceed their hedging concerns. We provide a standard neoclassical model in which households' ability to promise to pay is limited by the need to collateralize such promises. Collateral constraints hence restrict both financing as well as risk management as both require households to issue promises to pay. Given this link, households limit their risk management and may completely abstain from hedging when financing needs are sufficiently strong. Thus, the absence of household risk management and the lack of markets that provide such insurance should not be considered a puzzle.
Households' primary financing needs are two: purchases of durable goods and the accumulation of human capital. First, households consume the services of durable goods, most importantly housing, and the purchase of such goods needs to be financed. Second, investment in education requires financing, and education and learning-by-doing imply an age-income profile which is upward sloping on average. The bulk of financing actually extended to households is for purchases of durable goods. Indeed, more than 90% of household liabilities are attributable to durable goods purchases, mainly real estate (around 80%) and vehicles (around 6%), and less than 4% of household liabilities are attributable to education purposes.
1 We study a model in which all household borrowing needs to be collateralized by households' stocks of durable goods. Since most household financing is comprised of such loans, our model is plausible empirically. While households are able to borrow for education only to a very limited extent, consistent with our model, education and learning-by-doing are nevertheless important as they result in age-income profiles that are upward sloping on average which means that households have an incentive to borrow against the future using other means, namely, by financing durable goods. Shiller (1993) has argued that markets that allow households to manage their risks would significantly improve welfare and that the absence of such markets hence presents an important puzzle. For example, Shiller (2008) writes that " [t] he near absence of derivatives markets for real estate ... is a striking anomaly that cries out for explanation and for actions to change the situation." We provide a rationale why households may not use such markets even if they exist. And given this lack of demand from households, the absence of such markets may not be so puzzling after all. The explanation we provide is simple: households' primary concern is financing, that is, shifting funds from the future to today, not risk management, that is, not transferring funds across states in the future. Risk management would require households to make promises to pay in high income states in the future, but this would reduce households' ability to promise to pay in high income states to finance durable goods purchases today, because households' total promises are limited by collateral constraints. Our dynamic model of complete markets subject to collateral constraints allows an explicit analysis of the connection between financing and risk management, and shows that the cost of risk management may be too high.
Indeed, we show that household risk management is monotone in household net worth and income, under quite general conditions. We first show that optimal household risk management of risk averse households whose income follows a stationary Markov chain with a notion of positive persistence is monotone and incomplete, even in the long run, that is, under the stationary distribution of household net worth. We extend these results to an economy with durable goods that the households can borrow against, and show that the monotone risk management result generalizes. Finally, we consider durable goods price risk, in addition to income risk, and provide conditions for monotone risk management. Under some assumptions, households may partially hedge income risk but do not hedge durable goods price risk at all.
Consistent with the view that financing needs may override risk management concerns, we discuss evidence on U.S. households which suggests that poor (and financially constrained) households are less well insured against many types of risks, such as health risks or flood risks, than richer (and less financially constrained) households. Furthermore, a similar positive relation between income and risk management has recently been documented for farmers in developing economies, and we summarize the pertinent evidence. In addition, there is evidence that firms' financial constraints affect corporate risk management. For example, Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan (2012) document a strong positive correlation between firms' net worth and the extent of corporate risk management.
Many observers consider the relation between financing and corporate risk management puzzling. For example, the Wall Street Journal writes up to a year ahead. ... Certainly many small companies are still uncomfortable with hedging. Startups, which are generally strapped for resources, typically can't afford it."
The statements that hedging does not have any upfront cost, but cash strapped firms cannot afford hedging appear to be inconsistent. In an environment similar to the household finance context analyzed in this paper, Rampini and Viswanathan (2010, 2013) resolve this apparent inconsistency and argue that firms' financing needs may override their hedging concerns and thus severely constrained firms may abstain from risk management. This is in contrast to received theory, formalized by Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) , which suggests that constrained firms should hedge. The extant results in the literature do not take into account firms' financing needs and the link between financing and risk management induced by collateral constraints, and this literature hence reaches a rather different conclusion. One important consequence of the absence of risk management by constrained households and firms is that such households and firms are then more susceptible to shocks.
Section 2 analyzes household income risk management in an endowment economy with income risk only and derives the basic monotone household risk management result. Section 3 extends the model to an economy with durable goods and shows how the monotone risk management result generalizes and that financing needs for durable goods and education may override hedging concerns. Durable goods price risk management is analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 considers households' ability to rent durable goods and the interaction between the rent vs. buy decision and risk management.
3 Section 6 reviews the evidence on household and firm risk management. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Household Income Risk Management
In this section we consider household income risk management in an endowment economy. We show that optimal household income risk management is incomplete and monotone increasing in the households' net worth, that is, richer households are better insured.
3 The asset pricing implications of housing have recently been considered by Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005) and Piazzesi, Schneider, and Tuzel (2007) in economies with similar preferences over two goods, (nondurable) consumption and housing services. Both studies consider a frictionless rental market for housing unlike us, which reduces households' financing needs substantially. Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005) consider the role of solvency constraints similar to ours and Piazzesi, Schneider, and Tuzel (2007) study the frictionless benchmark.
Moreover, we show that there is a sense in which "the poor cannot afford insurance." Finally, we characterize household risk management in the long run and in an economy in which households are eventually unconstrained.
Household Finance in an Endowment Economy
Consider household income risk management in an endowment economy. Time is discrete and the horizon is infinite. Enforcement is limited as follows: households can abscond with their income and cannot be excluded from markets for state contingent claims in the future. Extending the results in Rampini and Viswanathan (2010, 2013) to this environment, one can show that the optimal dynamic contract with limited enforcement can be implemented with complete markets in one-period ahead Arrow securities subject to short sale constraints (which are a special case of collateral constraints).
In some parts of the analysis, we consider Markov chains which exhibit the following notion of positive persistence:
Definition 1 (Markov process with FOSD)
This definition requires that the distribution of states next period conditional on current state s + first order stochastically dominates the distribution conditional on current state s, for all s + > s. A Markov chain which is independent over time, that is, satisfies Π(s, s ) = Π(s ), ∀s ∈ S, exhibits FOSD. For a symmetric two-state Markov chain, FOSD is equivalent to assuming that Π(s,s) = Π(s, s) ≡ p ≥ 1/2, that is, that the autocorrela- 4 We discuss the case in which β = R −1 below.
tion ρ is positive, as ρ = 2p − 1 ≥ 0. Arguably, such positive autocorrelation in household income is plausible empirically.
Household's Income Risk Management Problem
The household solves the following recursive problem by choosing (non-negative) consumption c and a portfolio of Arrow securities h for each state s (and associated net worth w ) given the exogenous state s and the net worth w (cum current income),
subject to the budget constraints for the current and next period, ∀s ∈ S,
and the short sale constraints, ∀s ∈ S,
Since the return function is concave, the constraint set convex, and the operator defined by the program in (1) to (4) satisfies Blackwell's sufficient conditions, there exists a unique value function v which solves the Bellman equation. The value function v is strictly increasing and strictly concave. Denoting the multipliers on the budget constraints (2) and (3) by µ and βΠ(s, s )µ , respectively, and the multipliers on the short-sale constraints (4) by βΠ(s, s )λ , the first order conditions are
We have ignored the non-negativity constraint on consumption since it is not binding. The envelope condition is v w (w, s) = µ (see Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979) ).
Household Income Risk Management is Monotone
We now show that household risk management is monotone in household net worth. In particular, the set of states that the households hedge is increasing in net worth and richer households' net worth and consumption distribution next period dominate those of poorer households. Richer households moreover spend more on hedging. The key to the result is the fact that the marginal value of net worth v w (w, s) is decreasing not just in w, as before, but also in the state s. First order stochastic dominance means that if the household is in a higher state today, holding current net worth w constant, then the household's income next period is higher in a FOSD sense. This reduces the cost of hedging to a given level for each state tomorrow, as hedging decreases with the state, and hedging the same amount becomes less costly. The household partially consumes the resources that are thus freed up and partially uses them to buy additional Arrow securities, that is, purchase more insurance, allowing the household to consume more in the hedged states next period. Thus, parts (ii) and (iii) give a sense in which richer households are better insured.
Positive persistence in the income process hence means that a high income realization reduces the marginal value of net worth for two reasons: first, high current income raises current net worth, which lowers the marginal value of net worth due to concavity; and second, a high current income implies higher expected future income, further reducing the marginal value of net worth by the mechanism described above. In contrast, in a production economy with technology shocks, positive persistence has two effects which go in opposite directions: on the one hand, high current productivity implies high cash flow and thus raises current net worth, which lowers the marginal value of net worth due to the concavity of the value function; on the other hand, high current productivity increases the expected productivity which means firms would like to invest more, and this effect in turn raises the marginal value of net worth. Thus there are two competing effects when productivity shocks have positive persistence and if the second effect is sufficiently strong, firms hedge states with high productivity.
5
The proof is of technical interest as we prove that the marginal value of net worth is (weakly) decreasing in s by showing that the Bellman operator maps functions which satisfy this property into functions which satisfy the property as well, and since the space of functions which satisfies the property is closed, the unique fixed point must satisfy the property, too.
Under the additional assumption of independent income shocks, the household ensures a minimum level of net worth next period, which is increasing in current net worth. Moreover, the variance of both net worth and consumption next period is decreasing in current net worth, that is, there is a strong sense in which richer households are better insured. 
Incomplete Household Risk Management
We have a more explicit characterization of optimal income risk management when the Markov chain displays FOSD: 6 If income is lower in a downturns and risk management consequently declines, then the cross sectional variation of consumption can be countercyclical, a property documented by Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) that is of interest due to its asset pricing implications (see, for example, Mankiw (1986) and Constantinides and Duffie (1996) ). Guvenen, Ozkan, and Song (2012) find that the left-skewness of idiosyncratic income shocks is countercyclical, rather than the variance itself, in earnings data from the U.S. Social Security Administration. Rampini (2004) provides a real business cycle model with entrepreneurs subject to moral hazard in which the cross sectional variation of the optimal incentive compatible allocation is similarly countercyclical. At net worth y (and in state s) the household does not hedge at all, which can be interpreted as saying that "the poor can't afford insurance." Moreover, even at net worthȳ, the household does not engage in complete risk management, and given monotonicity the household hence does not hedge the highest state for any level of wealth w ≤ȳ. Figure 1 illustrates Propositions 2 and 3 for an economy with an independent, symmetric two state Markov chain. The top right panel illustrates the monotonicity of household risk management, with the top left panel showing that consumption is concave in wealth and hence richer households actually spend a larger fraction of their budget on Arrow securities to hedge future income shocks.
In our model of income risk management without durable goods, household insurance can be interpreted as state-contingent savings. The properties of such state-contingent savings are similar to the properties of savings noted by Friedman (1957) in his famous treatise A Theory of the Consumption Function (page 39):
"These regressions show savings to be negative at low measured income levels, and to be a successively larger fraction of income, the higher the measured income. If low measured income is identified with 'poor' and high measured income with 'rich,' it follows that the 'poor' are getting poorer and the 'rich' are getting richer. The identification of low measured income with 'poor' and high measured income with 'rich' is justified only if measured income can be regarded as an estimate of expected income over a lifetime or a large fraction thereof."
In our model, all households have the same expected income in the long run, and therefore households that are currently poor hedge less, that is, have lower state-contingent savings, than households that are currently rich, and thus our model yields a "theory of the insurance function" akin to Friedman's (1957) theory of the consumption function.
Comparison to Precautionary Savings Models
We briefly compare our results to the behavior of precautionary savings in the standard incomplete markets model of Bewley (1977) and others. The household solves the following recursive problem by choosing (non-negative) consumption c and precautionary savings h which do not vary with the state s next period (and associated net worth w ) given the exogenous state s and the net worth w (cum current income),
and the short sale constraint h ≥ 0.
While this model behaves similarly to ours in many ways, we stress that household risk management is not monotone in the Bewley model, in the sense that precautionary savings are decreasing in the current state s, which means that the household's consumption is lower in some states next period when the current state s is higher. The parallels between our model and the Bewley economy are that since v w (w, s) is decreasing in w and s in both cases, the envelope condition implies that current consumption c is increasing in w and s in both economies as well. Therefore, both risk management expenditures E[R −1 h |s] in our model and precautionary savings h in the Bewley economy increase in w given s and decrease in s given w. The key distinction however is that household risk management h in our model increases in s, for all s ∈ S, although as stated before the total risk management expenditures
Proposition 4 (Household risk management in Bewley model not monotone) Assume that Π(s, s ) displays FOSD. (i) The marginal value of net worth v w (w, s) is decreasing in net worth
in s; in other words, w and c increase in s, and household risk management is monotone in s in this sense. In contrast, precautionary savings h decrease in s implying that net worth and consumption in the lowest state next period w(s ) and c(s ) decrease in s; this is the sense in which household risk management in not monotone in s in the Bewley economy.
Household Risk Management in the Long Run
How does household risk management behave in the long run, given that households can accumulate net worth? When the income process is independent, we show that the model induces a stationary distribution for household net worth. Under the unique stationary distribution, households never hedge completely. Notably, households abstain from risk management completely with positive probability under the stationary distribution. This means that even households whose current net worth is high, that are hit by a sufficiently long sequence of low income realizations, end up so constrained again that they no longer purchase any Arrow securities, that is, stop buying any insurance at all. and the high income realization (ȳ = 1.5). The household never hedges the high state next period, which means the household's net worth conditional on a high realization is always w(s ) =ȳ as the bottom panel shows. The household does hedge low realization on income, at least as long as net worth is sufficiently high, so starting from net worthȳ low income realization decrease the household's net worth gradually over time, as the middle panel illustrates; the probability mass decreases at a rate π(s) in this range. Eventually, the household stops hedging, and subsequent realizations result in net worth y until a high income realization lifts the household's net worth again.
Proposition 5 (Household risk management under the stationary distribution)
Suppose Π(s, s ) = π(s ), ∀s, s ∈ S. (i)
Risk Management when Households are Eventually Unconstrained
Consider the limit of the above economy where βR = 1, which means that households are eventually unconstrained. We show that the economy displays full insurance under the stationary distribution in the limit and that household net worth is nevertheless bounded in the limit. These results are related to results for the classic class of income fluctuations problems studied by Yaari (1976) , Schechtman (1976) , Bewley (1980) , Aiyagari (1994) , and others, in which households solve a consumption savings problem with non-contingent debt and borrowing constraints, that is, have access to incomplete markets only. 7 Our results are similar in that there is complete consumption insurance in the limit, but they are rather different in that net worth is bounded in the limit whereas it grows without bound in these related papers. We emphasize that for net worth levels beloww, household risk management is incomplete and monotone in current net worth even when βR = 1, although such levels of net worth are transient. The main result of our paper hence obtains even in this case, albeit only in the transition.
When income is independent over time and βR = 1, we know from equation (7) and the envelope condition that v w (w) = v w (w ) + λ and therefore v w (w) is non-increasing. Denoting the upper bound of net worth under the stationary distribution byw, we hence have v w (w) ≥ v w (w ), but by strict concavity v w (w) ≤ v w (w ), and thusw = w , ∀s ∈ S, that is,w is absorbing. Note that for w <ȳ, λ(s ) > 0 and w(s ) =ȳ. Moreover, suppose ∃s ∈ S, such that w >ȳ, then v w (ȳ) > v w (w ) and λ > 0, that is, w = y ≤ȳ, a contradiction. Therefore, w =ȳ, for all s ∈ S. Thus, the stationary net worth distribution collapses to unit mass atw =ȳ.
The full insurance result is general, that is, does not require independence of the income process:
Proposition 6 (Full insurance under the stationary distribution in the limit) When βR = 1, the household engages in full insurance under the stationary distribution.
In the case of a symmetric two state Markov chain for income, we can solve for the stationary distribution of net worth in closed form.
We use subscripts L and H where convenient. Using the fact that the stationary distribution of y is (1/2, 1/2) and that w H = y H since the household does not hedge the highest state next period given FOSD (
where ρ = 2p − 1 ≥ 0 and r ≡ R − 1. When income is independent over time, p = 1/2 and ρ = 0, we have
Note that w L ≥ w H and that the difference w L − w H is increasing in the persistence ρ. So net worth as we defined it is higher in the low state than in the high state. To see why this is, denote the present value of income (ex current income), that is, human capital, by P V s , and note that
wealth, (financial) net worth plus human capital, is constant across states. When the household has low current income, his (financial) net worth is high to compensate for the reduction in present value of future labor income. When income is independent over time, the present value of future labor income is constant across states and so is the household's (financial) net worth.
To sum up, when βR = 1, households are eventually unconstrained and fully insured, but their net worth remains finite, in contrast to the models with incomplete markets in which households accumulate infinite buffer stocks to smooth consumption in the limit.
Remark on Limit Behavior of Corporate Risk Management
There is an interesting related result for corporate risk management. Consider the limit as βR goes to 1 in the corresponding firm financing model (see Rampini and Viswanathan (2013) ). In the limit, firms are eventually unconstrained and engage in complete risk management. This suggests that unconstrained firms should be thought of as being completely hedged. Instead, such firms are often interpreted as not hedging at all, because financial structure does not matter in a frictionless economy, the insight of the celebrated Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem. It is of course true that at the limit, the corporate risk management policy is not uniquely determined, given the linearity of the payoff function of a risk neutral firm, and the firm could hedge by retaining a sufficient buffer stock to cover any low income realizations in the future. But the unique limit is full risk management; in other words, the net worth minimal way of running a firm when βR = 1 involves complete risk management, not no risk management at all. This result may be empirically relevant as we are not aware of any evidence that corporate risk management declines when firms are very well capitalized.
Household Risk Management with Durable Goods
This section extends our model of household finance to include durable goods. The monotone household risk management results generalize to this environment to a large extent. Moreover, we show that for households with sufficiently low net worth financing needs override hedging concerns, and consider the additional financing needs for education purposes.
Household Finance with Durable Goods
Consider an extension of the economy of Section 2 with two goods, (non-durable) consumption c and durable goods k, which in practice comprise mainly housing. The environment, income process, and lenders are as before, but households have separable preferences E[
is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satisfies lim k→0 g k (k) = +∞ and lim k→∞ g k (k) = 0. Durable goods depreciate at rate δ ∈ (0, 1) and the price in terms of consumption goods is assumed to be constant and normalized to 1, ∀s ∈ S. Households can adjust their durable goods stock freely, but there is no rental market for durable goods and households have to purchase durable goods to consume their services. Durable goods are also used as collateral as we discuss below. We consider durable goods price risk in Section 4 and analyze the implications of households' ability to rent durables as well as purchase durables and borrow against them in Section 5.
Enforcement is limited as follows: households can abscond with their income and a fraction 1 − θ of durable goods, where θ ∈ (0, 1), and cannot be excluded from markets for state contingent claims or durable goods. As before, one can show that the optimal dynamic contract with limited enforcement can be implemented with complete markets in one-period Arrow securities subject to collateral constraints that limit the household's promises b in state s next period as follows:
The only friction we add to the standard neoclassical environment is that claims need to be collateralized to enforce repayment. Moreover, we assume that there is no rental market for capital for now. Importantly, our environment is one with full information. Thus, households are able to trade contingent claims on all states of nature, which allows them to engage in risk management.
The simplest and equivalent formulation of the household's problem is to assume that the household levers durable assets fully, that is, borrowsb = R −1 θk(1 − δ), ∀s ∈ S, and purchases Arrow securities in the amount h = θk(1 − δ) − Rb , ∀s ∈ S. Under this equivalent formulation, the collateral constraints on b reduce to short sale constraints on h . Moreover, since the household borrows as much as possible against durable assets, the household pays down ℘ ≡ 1 − R −1 θ(1 − δ) per unit of durable assets purchased only.
The household solves the following recursive problem by choosing (non-negative) consumption c, durable goods k, and a portfolio of Arrow securities h for each state s (and associated net worth w ) given the exogenous state s and the net worth w (cum current income and durable goods net of borrowing),
and the short sale constraints (4), ∀s ∈ S.
Note that the value function is written excluding the service flow of the current stock of durable goods. The return function u(c)+βg(k) includes the service flow of durables purchased this period for use next period, which is deterministic given purchases of durables this period. This definition of the value function and net worth allows us to formulate the problem with one endogenous state variable, net worth w, only. Arguing analogously to before, there exists a unique value function which is strictly increasing and strictly concave. Note that there is no need to impose non-negativity constraints on consumption and durable goods as these are slack given our preference assumptions. Defining the multipliers as before, the first order conditions are (5) through (7) and
or written as an investment Euler equation for durable goods
The first term on the right hand side is the service flow of the durable goods purchased this period and consumed next period, that is, the "dividend yield" of durables, and the second term on the right hand side is the return from the resale value of durables net of borrowing. Since durables are fully levered,
is in the denominator as this is the amount of net worth the household has to invest per unit of durable assets.
Monotonicity of Household Risk Management with Durable

Goods
With durable goods, household risk management is monotone in net worth in the sense that the household's net worth w next period is strictly increasing in current net worth.
Unlike in the economy with income risk only in Section 2, we can no longer conclude that the household's purchases of Arrow securities necessarily increase in wealth, as the household also buys more durables which increases its net worth next period. With independence of the income process, the household hedges a lower set of income realizations and household risk management is incomplete under the stationary distribution. 
Financing Needs Override Risk Management Concerns
We now show that if a household's financing needs are sufficiently strong, then financing needs override hedging concerns. Noting that the budget constraint next period (3) binds in all states and that purchases of Arrow securities are limited by short-sale constraints (4), we know that net worth w in state s next period is bounded below, namely,
Households' limited ability to promise implies that their net worth w next period in all states is bounded below. But this means that the household must be collateral constrained against all states s next period if the household's current net worth w is sufficiently low, since the marginal value of net worth next period must be bounded above.
Proposition 9 (Financing needs override risk management concerns) If a household's current net worth w is sufficiently low, the household is constrained against all states next period, and hence does not engage in risk management.
Households' limited ability to credibly promise repayment means that households cannot pledge future income and households' net worth has to be at least future labor income. Moreover durable goods purchases require some down payment per unit of capital from the household and hence implicitly force households to shift additional net worth to the next period. Both these aspects imply that if current household net worth is relatively low, the household shifts resources to the present to the extent possible, that is, borrows as much as possible against durable goods.
Panel A of Figure 3 illustrates Propositions 8 and 9 in the case of an independent symmetric two state Markov process for income. The consumption of both non-durables and durables are concave in household net worth, consistent with one of the basic stylized facts of the empirical consumption literature. Hedging is increasing in net worth; indeed, for low net worth the household does not hedge at all. The household hedges the low state only once net worth reaches a relatively high level, about the level of the high income in the example. This is due to the financing needs for the purchases of durable goods, which force the household to save. At the bottom of the stationary distribution (where w(s ) intersects the 45-degree line, the household does not hedge at all. This level of net worth is also considerably above the low income. The financing needs for durable goods reduce household risk management.
Effect of Persistence and Collateralizability on Hedging
Panel B of Figure 3 illustrates the effect of persistence on household risk management by considering the example from Section 3.3 except with a Markov process for income with autocorrelation 0.5 instead of 0. When income is persistent, the household consumes more non-durables and durables in the high state than in the low state, holding net worth constant. Moreover, the household hedges the low state more, in particular when the current state is high. Thus an increase in persistence increases household risk management. That said, the household saves less for the high state, in particular when the current state is low. Figure 4 illustrates the effect of collateralizability by considering the example from Section 3.3 except with collateralizability θ = 0.6 instead of 0.8. The effects are striking. The household reduces consumption of non-durables and durables for given net worth. The household drastically reduces risk management and does not hedge at all until a much higher level of net worth is reached and even then, hedges much less. Essentially, the household is forced to save so much to finance its durable goods purchases that it chooses not to hedge. At the same time, the households' stationary distribution of net worth shifts to the right. This comparative statics result provides an interesting perspective on the effects of financial development, which we interpret as an increase in collateralizability. Financial development that allows households to lever durable goods more, results in lower household net worth accumulation, which all else equal would leave them more susceptible to shocks. Thus, financial development increases household risk management. By enabling higher leverage, financial development renders households' risk management concerns more pertinent.
Financing Education
Age-income profiles are upward sloping on average partly because of economic growth and partly presumably because of learning by doing, that is, skill accumulation with experience. These properties of the labor income process give households further incentives to borrow as much as they can against their durable goods, such as housing, and thus exhaust their debt capacity and abstain from risk management. Suppose moreover that households are able to invest in education or human capital e. An amount of education e invested in the current period, which includes both foregone labor income and direct costs, results in income A f (e) in state s next period, where f is strictly increasing and strictly concave, lim e→0 f e (e) = +∞, and lim e→∞ f e (e) = 0, and the productivity of human capital A > 0, for all s ∈ S, is described by a Markov process also summarized by state s. Human capital depreciates at a rate δ e ∈ (0, 1). Note that households in our model can borrow against neither future labor income nor human capital, as education capital is inalienable, and can only borrow against durable goods. The household's problem is to choose (non-negative) consumption c, durable goods k, education e, and a portfolio of Arrow securities h (with associated net worth w ) for each state s given the exogenous state s and net worth w (cum current income, durable goods net of borrowing, and human capital) to maximize (12) subject to the budget constraints for the current and next period, ∀s ∈ S,
and the short sale constraints (4), ∀s ∈ S. Note that the household's problem is still well behaved, that is, the constraint set is convex.
Proposition 10 In the problem with education, that is, investment in human capital, if a household's current net worth w is sufficiently low, the household is constrained against all states next period and hence does not engage in risk management.
The household's Euler equation for education, that is, investment in human capital, can be written as
The budget constraint (17) implies that w ≥ e and hence as w goes to zero, so does e implying that f e (e) goes to +∞. But then βv w (w , s )/v w (w, s) must go to zero, ∀s ∈ S, using the Euler equation for investment in education, and, using equation (7), βλ /µ must go to R −1 implying that the multipliers on the short sale constraints λ > 0, ∀s ∈ S.
The intuition is that if the household's net worth is sufficiently low, then the household's education decreases so much that the marginal rate of transformation on investment in human capital eventually exceeds the return on saving net worth for state s , for all states. Investment in education is an additional reason why households are likely to have higher net worth later in life, giving them further incentives to finance as much of their durable goods purchases as they can, rather than using their limited ability to pledge to shift funds across states later on.
Durable Goods Price Risk Management
In this section we consider an economy with durable goods price risk. Suppose the price of durable goods q(s) is stochastic, where the state s describes the joint evolution of income y(s) and q(s), and the economy is otherwise the same as in Section 3.
8 As in that section, we assume without loss of generality that the household levers durable assets 8 In Section 3, the price of durable goods is constant and normalized to 1.
fully, that is, borrowsb = R −1 θq k(1 − δ), ∀s ∈ S, and purchases Arrow securities in the amount h , ∀s ∈ S. The collateral constraints again reduce to short sale constraints. Moreover, since the household borrows as much as possible against durable assets, the household pays down ℘(s) ≡ q(s)−R −1 θE[q |s](1−δ) per unit of durable assets purchased only. We assume that q(s) and ℘(s) are increasing in s, although some of our results obtain more generally. The household's problem, formulated recursively, is to choose (non-negative) consumption c, durable goods k, and a portfolio of Arrow securities h for each state s (and associated net worth w ) given the exogenous state s and the net worth w (cum current income and durable goods net of borrowing), to maximize (12) subject to the budget constraints for the current and next period, ∀s ∈ S,
and the short sale constraints (4), ∀s ∈ S. Defining the multipliers as before, the first order conditions are (5) through (7) and
The durable goods price affects the down payment ℘(s) in the current period and the resale value of durable goods next period. If the household cannot pledge the full resale value of durables, that is, if θ < 1, then durable goods purchases force the household to implicitly save. Moreover, the household is then exposed to the price risk of durables in two ways: first, the resale value of durable goods affects the household's net worth next period, and second, the durable goods price affects the down payment which in turn affects the marginal value of net worth. If the household can pledge the full resale value of durables, that is, if θ = 1, the second term on the right hand side of (22) is zero, and the first order condition simplifies to ℘(s)µ = βg k (k). In this case, the durable goods price only affects the household's problem through the down payment. We are able to characterize the solution explicitly in the case of isoelastic preferences with coefficient of relative risk aversion γ ≤ 1 : household risk management is monotone. Specifically, we show that the economy is equivalent to an economy with income risk and preference shocks. With logarithmic preferences, households do not hedge the durable goods price risk at all, but may partially hedge income risk. With γ < 1, higher durable goods prices, and hence higher down payments, reduce the marginal value of net worth as the substitution effect dominates the income effect. In other words, lower house prices amount to investment opportunities and raise the marginal value of net worth. (1) through (4) More generally, when θ < 1, a drop in the durable goods price lowers the household's net worth and hence raises the marginal utility of net worth, and, when γ < 1, the low durable goods price may further raise the marginal utility of net worth. Thus, households likely hedge low durable goods prices in this case. In contrast, when γ > 1, a drop in the durable goods price has two opposing effects, on the one hand lowering net worth and on the other hand raising the marginal utility of net worth due to the price effect. This additional effect reduces the household's hedging demand. Under plausible parameterizations, the direct effect on net worth arguably dominates nonetheless, but this quantitative question remains to be analyzed. 9 Figure 5 illustrates the effect of durable goods price risk on the household's consumption and insurance problem. Panel A considers the case with an independent process for income and durable goods prices. Note that we consider an example in which income and the price of durables are perfectly correlated, that is, there are two states only, one with high income and a high durable goods price and one with low income and a low durable goods price. For given net worth, when the durable goods price is currently low, the household consume more non-durables and durables and hedges less. The household hedges less because the higher durable goods purchases force the household to save more resulting in a higher level of net worth next period. At the bottom of the stationary distribution, and for levels of net worth below that, the household does not hedge at all. This implies that the household chooses not to hedge the price risk of durable goods when the household is sufficiently constrained.
Panel B of Figure 5 illustrates the effect of persistence of income and durable goods prices. Persistence reduces the effect of the current price of durables on consumption and increases risk management for the low state, in particular when the current price of durables is high and the household hence purchases less durable goods. Importantly, as before, households with low net worth do not hedge the house price risk even under the stationary distribution.
Risk Management and the Buy vs. Rent Decision
In the analysis so far we have not considered households' ability to rent durable goods. If there were a frictionless rental market, ownership of a durable good and the use of its services would be separable. The need to collateralize claims might still limit risk sharing, 10 but tenure choice would not affect households' portfolio choice. Moreover, households' demand for housing services would not induce a substantial financing need in that case. In this section we consider a rental market which is not frictionless. Renting durable goods is possible, albeit costly, but relaxes collateral constraints as landlords or lessors can more easily repossess rented durables. A similar market for rented capital has been analyzed in a corporate finance context by Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009) and Rampini and Viswanathan (2013) . Sufficiently constrained households choose to rent, which affects their risk management or portfolio choice. Because renting housing is costly, households will continue to have a strong incentive to own housing and hence face considerable financing needs for housing. We are able to characterize the interaction between risk management and home ownership since in our model markets are complete, although subject to collateral constraints. In contrast the literature typically studies the interaction of the risk of home ownership and portfolio choice under the assumption that markets are incomplete. Sinai and Souleles (2005) argue that both home ownership and renting are risky when households do not have access to complete markets. Our model may also provide a useful framework to study household interest rate risk management, which Campbell and Cocco (2003) model as the choice of mortgage type, specifically the choice between adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) and fixed rate mortgages.
[ TO BE COMPLETED.] 
Stylized Facts on Household Risk Management
In this section we briefly survey evidence of what we consider a stylized fact, namely that poor (and more financially constrained) households are less well insured than richer (and less financially constrained) households. Indeed, we think this is part of a much broader pattern applying to entrepreneurial households and firms as well, and we briefly discuss evidence on risk management by Indian farmers and U.S. corporations suggesting that financial constraints reduce risk management substantially.
Among U.S. households, health insurance coverage varies considerably with income and age according to data from the U.S. Census Bureau.
11 The percentage of people without health insurance in the U.S. decreases from 25% of people with income less than $25,000 to 21% for people with income between $25,000 and $50,000, and further decreases to 15% of people with income between $50,000 and $75,000 and finally decreases to 8% of people with income exceeding $75,000. Similarly, by age, the fraction of adults without health insurance decreases from 28% and 26% for age groups 18-24 and 25-34, respectively, to 18% and 14% for age groups 35-44 and 45-64, respectively, and to less than 2% for age group 65 and up. Brown and Finkelstein (2007) report that participation in long-term care insurance by individuals aged 60 and over also varies substantially by wealth in U.S. data, increasing from about 3% for the bottom wealth quartile to about 6%, 11%, and 20% for the second, third, and top quartile, respectively. 12 Browne and Hoyt (2000) find that flood insurance coverage, both in terms of the number of policies per capita and the amount of coverage per capita, is positively correlated with disposable personal income per capita using U.S. state level data. Clearly, the extent to which households are insured hence varies substantially with households' income. And, assuming that individuals in age group 18-24 and age group 25-34 are more financially constrained, households' insurance level also seems to vary with financial constraints. This cross-sectional evidence is consistent with the view that there is an important connection between household risk management and households' financial constraints. That said, there are certainly other reasons why insurance participation varies with income, such as crowding out of private insurance by public programs, as stressed, for example, by Brown and Finkelstein (2008) , financial literacy that varies with income, or fixed costs of obtaining insurance. We now turn to data documenting the relation between insurance coverage and income using withinhousehold variation, which is consistent with our theory and challenges explanations based 11 on financial literacy or fixed costs. Fang and Kung (2012) use panel data for males from the Health and Retirement Survey, a representative longitudinal survey of older Americans conducted every two years. They find that income shocks are one of the important determinants of whether individuals maintain or lapse life insurance coverage, along with changes in health and marital status. The probability of buying life insurance increases with income and importantly the probability of lapsing coverage decreases with income; "individuals who experience negative income shocks are more likely to lapse all coverage." Therefore, the withinhousehold variation in insurance coverage seems consistent with the predictions of our model.
Among farmers in rural India, Giné, Townsend, and Vickery (2008) find that participation in rainfall insurance programs increases in wealth and decreases with measures of borrowing constraints. Cole, Giné, Tobacman, Topalova, Townsend, and Vickery (2013) provide evidence on the importance of credit constraints for the adoption of rainfall insurance using randomized field experiments in rural India. Farmers who are randomly surprised with a positive liquidity shock are much more likely to buy insurance. Moreover, the authors report that the most frequently stated reason for not purchasing insurance is "insufficient funds to buy insurance." Farmers might of course use other risk sharing mechanisms, including informal ones. To overcome the limitation of analyzing specific risk sharing mechanisms in isolation, Townsend (1994) studies data on Indian farmers' household consumption directly in a seminal paper. Townsend finds that, while the full insurance model provides a remarkably good benchmark, " [t] here is evidence that the landless are less well insured than their village neighbors in one of the three villages." That is, there is "a hint of a pattern by land class. Specifically, the landless and small farmers in Aurepalle and the small and medium farmers in Shirapur seem more vulnerable."
In the spirit of the Townsend (1994) critique, Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) study the extent of insurance by analyzing the income and consumption distribution for U.S. households jointly. They find "some partial insurance of permanent shocks, especially for the college educated and those near retirement.
[They] find full insurance of transitory shocks except among poor households." Overall, we conclude that there is a basic pattern in household insurance: richer households are better insured than poorer households.
For firms, Rampini, Sufi, and Viswanathan (2012) find a strong positive correlation between net worth and risk management both in the cross section and within firms over time in data on fuel price risk management by U.S. airlines. Moreover, they document a remarkable drop in fuel price hedging as airlines approach distress which reverses only slowly after distress. Relatedly, the corporate finance literature documents a strong size pattern in risk management, when measured by participation of firms in derivatives markets, among U.S. corporations overall. For example, Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993) find that firms which do not hedge are smaller, and pay lower dividends, in survey data for large industrial firms. Similarly, Géczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) find a strong positive relation between derivatives use and firm size among large U.S. firms.
13 The evidence on the relation between corporate risk management and other financial variables is more mixed (see, for example, Tufano (1996) as well as the aforementioned studies). Nevertheless, the basic pattern for corporate insurance seems to be the same as for households: better financed firms engage in more risk management and poorly financed firms engage at best in limited and typically in no risk management at all.
Conclusion
An explicit analysis of household risk management is provided in which households have access to complete markets subject to collateral constraints. We show the optimality of monotone household risk management, that is, risk management that increases in household net worth and income, under quite general conditions. Durable goods, most importantly housing, are used as collateral. In the absence of a frictionless rental market, households' demand for the services of consumer durables results in substantial financing needs. We show that if these financing needs are sufficiently strong, they override hedging concerns, which explains the almost complete absence of household risk management. In our view, proposals to introduce new markets providing household risk management tools are hence unlikely to be successful, as households may not use such markets even if they exist. The fact that household risk management may require collateral in the form of margins has been recognized in the literature, but not explicitly analyzed. For example, Athanasoulis and Shiller (2000) write that " [m] argin requirements might deal with this [collection] problem, but only for people who have sufficient assets as margin. We will disregard these kinds of ... problems." Our work, in contrast, suggests that collateral constraints, together with households' other financing needs, are at the heart of the ex-planation why household risk management is limited. (7) and the envelope condition, we have v w (w) = βRv w (w) + βRλ(s ), implying that λ(s ) > 0 and hence w(s ) =ȳ. Suppose net worth w t at time t is such that w t >ȳ. Any path which reaches a state s t+n against which the household is constrained in t+n periods results in a household net worth w(s t+n ) = y(s t+n ) ≤ȳ and indeed net worth is bounded above byȳ from then onwards. Consider a path along which the household is never constrained; since v w (w) = βRv w (w ) along such a path, ∃n < ∞, such that v w (w t+n ) = (βR) −n v w (w t ) > v w (ȳ) and hence again w t+n <ȳ at time t + n and thereafter. Thus, net worth levels aboveȳ are transient. Since (3) holds with equality and using (4), w ≥ y ≥ y; levels of net worth w < y are therefore transient.
Part (iii):
Household risk management is monotone by Proposition 1 and incomplete with probability 1 since the stationary distribution of net worth is bounded above byȳ and risk management is monotone and incomplete at w =ȳ by Part (ii) of Proposition 3.
By Part (i) of that proposition, risk management is completely absent at w = y; by continuity, ∃ε > 0 such that for w >w with |w −w| < ε, v w (w) > βRv w (y), which means that the household does not hedge at all in this neighborhood. Clearly,w has positive probability under the stationary distribution since household incomeȳ has positive probability under the stationary distribution of income. If the household does not hedge s atw, then w has strictly positive probability. Consider instead a path along which the household continues to hedge the lowest income realization the following period, then ∃n < ∞ such that v w (w t+n ) = (βR) −n v w (w) > v w (y)and hence w t+n < y, which is not possible. So the household must stop hedging the lowest state after a finite sequence of lowest income realizations, that is, the household does not hedge at all with positive probability under the stationary distribution. 2 Proof of Proposition 6. From equation (7) To see that k is strictly increasing in w given s, take w + > w and note that by strict concavity of v, µ + < µ.
Rewriting the Euler equation for durable goods purchases (16) we have
Assume, without loss of generality, that
To see that w is strictly increasing in w given s, ∀s ∈ S, assume again w.l.o.g.
Part (ii): To see that the household hedges a lower interval of states, suppose that s + > s , and h(s + ) > 0 but h(s ) = 0; then
Sincew is the highest wealth level that is attained under the stationary distribution, we have atw that v w (w) = βRv w (w ) + βRλ(s ), so λ(s ) > 0. Now suppose ∃w <w such that the household hedges all states at w implying that v w (w) = βRv w (w ), ∀s ∈ S, that is, net worth next period must be lower than net worth this period in all states. But then there must exists a w − < w such that w − (s ) > w(s ) (since otherwisew could not be attained), which implies that w(s
Proof of Proposition 8. Part (i): The proof proceeds analogously to the Proof of Part (i) of Proposition 2. We show that if the property that v w (w, s) is decreasing in s is satisfied by v next period, then T v satisfies the property this period, and conclude that the fixed point satisfies the property as well. Moreover, as before, we observe that if the property is satisfied next period, then the household hedges a lower set of states and h is decreasing in s . Now suppose that ∃s + > s, such that T v w (w, s + ) > Tv w (w, s), implying by the envelope condition that c + < c. From the budget constraint(2) we have
and given FOSD and the fact that h is decreasing in s we have
Suppose k + ≤ k. There must exist anŝ such that w + (ŝ ) > w(ŝ ), since otherwise T v(w, s + ) < T v(w, s) as consumption of goods and durables and the net worth next period are all lower at s + than s. But then h(ŝ > 0 and therefore βRµ
Recalling that R −1 ≥ βµ /µ and that the right hand side is decreasing in s , the Euler equation for durables (16) implies 
which in the case of logarithmic utility further simplifies to k = (βg/℘(s))c. Define the total expenditure on consumption and durable goods asĉ = c + ℘(s)k = (1 + βg)c. Substituting for c and k in the return function we havê
where ϕ(s) = −(1+βg) log(1+βg)+βg log(βg)−βg log(℘(s)). The problem with durable goods can then be written as an income risk management problem with preference shocks
subject to
(3), and (4). Letv(w, s) solve the following income risk management problem without preference shocksv (w, s) = max
subject to (25), (3), and (4). This is in fact the problem considered in Section 3. Noting that the preference shock component of utility ϕ(s) is separable and defining v ϕ (s) recursively as 
The proof of Proposition 1 applies without change.
Suppose Π(s, s ) satisfies FOSD and ℘(s) is increasing in s.
To prove that v w (w, s) is decreasing in s when γ < 1, first observe that φ(s) is decreasing in s in that case (whereas it is increasing in s if γ > 1). We can now proceed as in the proof of the first part of Part (ii) of Proposition 2, that is, we assume that the property is satisfied by v(·) next period and then show that it has to be satisfied by T v(·) in the current period as well. As before, note that if the property is satisfied next period, the household hedges a lower set of states and h decreases in s . Suppose the opposite, that is, suppose ∃s + > s, such that T v w (w, s + ) > T v w (w, s), implying by the envelope condition that φ(s + )u(ĉ + ) = µ + > µ = φ(s)u(ĉ) and therefore u(ĉ + ) > φ(s)/φ(s + )u(ĉ) ≥ u(ĉ), which further implies thatĉ + <ĉ. Since h is decreasing in s , E[R −1 h |s] ≤ E[R −1 h |s + ] and {ĉ, h , w } is feasible at s + . Sinceĉ + <ĉ, ∃ŝ such that w + (ŝ ) > w(ŝ ) since otherwise {ĉ + , h + , w + } would achieve lower utility than switching to {ĉ, h , w }, contradicting optimality. But then y(ŝ ) + h + (ŝ ) = w + (ŝ ) > w(ŝ ) = y(ŝ ) + h(ŝ ) and h + (ŝ ) > h(ŝ ) ≥ 0, so βRµ + (w + (ŝ ),ŝ ) = µ + > µ ≥ βR(w(ŝ ),ŝ ), implying w + (ŝ ) < w(ŝ ), a contradiction. Therefore v w (w, s) is decreasing in s, and the rest of the proposition obtains from the proof of Part (ii) of Proposition 2 without change. 2 
